Housing and pension wealth are shown to be important determinants of personal sector consumption and retirement behaviour in the UK. Housing and state pension wealth have a positive effect on consumption, while private pension wealth promotes greater savings. Greater private defined benefit pension wealth encourages earlier retirement, while greater defined contribution pension wealth has the effect of delaying retirement. State pension wealth appears to have no effect on the retirement decision. Other variables relating to income, labour market and demographic status and spillovers from other sectors are also shown to be important. The consumption equation forecasts the late 1980s boom and the early 1990s slump in the UK better than other models that disregard housing and pension wealth. A particularly important cause of the boom was the huge private pension fund surpluses that accrued as a result of the stock market boom of the 1980s.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the years, the specification of mainstream aggregate consumption functions has become increasingly more sophisticated. From a humble beginning as a simple relationship between current consumption and current income, additional independent variables have been added (e.g. income uncertainty, the relative price of non-durables, unemployment rate, inflation rate) and wealth has joined income as a principal explanatory variable. Even the wealth measure has become more comprehensive over time, starting with liquid assets and subsequently being extended to include durables, financial and housing assets. However, one key component of wealth has not been adequately assessed in mainstream aggregate consumption functions and that is pension wealth. Yet pension wealth is enormous, accounting for 50% of all personal wealth in the UK, for example.
A different literature, originating with Feldstein (1974) , has used the aggregate consumption function with various types of pension wealth to test, amongst other things, various hypotheses in public finance, such as whether Ricardian equivalence holds. At the same time, there have been criticisms both of the measures of pension wealth and of the underlying model (namely the extended life cycle model) used to test these hypotheses.
This paper brings together a number of different strands from the above literatures. Its principal aim is to examine the impact on consumption and retirement behaviour of various components of wealth, especially pension wealth. It does so within the context of a well-specified econometric model that is developed from a specific economic model underlying optimizing consumption behaviour.
1 Finally, it uses superior measures of the wealth variables than have hitherto been used. For example, all the pension wealth estimates are based on appropriate actuarial methods as explained in Blake and Orszag (1999) .
The resulting model should be seen in the light of Hendry's (1994) 1980s] lies in the behaviour of excluded factors rather than changes in included factors that were inappropriately modelled. Thus the focus [in his paper] shifts to interactions with financial deregulation and uncertainty. . .. The impact of such additional variables as unemployment and interest rates was tested without any positive evidence resulting, but demographic change, illiquid wealth and house prices were not tested for relevance, although they could all potentially matter. Thus a great deal remains to be learnt about the behaviour of this much studied aggregate. ' (p.87) The outline of the paper is as follows. Section II reviews the literature on the impact of pension wealth on consumption, savings and induced retirement. Section III presents a model of consumption and retirement behaviour, while the estimated models are discussed in Section IV. Section V concludes.
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON THE IMPACT OF PENSION WEALTH ON CONSUMPTION, SAVINGS AND INDUCED RETIREMENT
The earliest time series studies of the effect of (state) pension wealth on consumption and savings behaviour were those of Feldstein (1974 Feldstein ( , 1976 Feldstein ( , 1979 Feldstein ( , 1982 . He used the life cycle model with induced retirement to identify a savings replacement (or wealth substitution) effect and a retirement effect. With the first effect, state pensions reduce the need to save privately for retirement. With the second effect, state pensions induce workers to retire earlier than they otherwise would and this increases the need to save privately for retirement in order to maintain living standards. The net effect of these two opposing influences is an empirical matter and Feldstein's own time series estimates on US data over the period (even when corrected for the computer programming error identified by Leimer and Lesnoy (1982) ) indicated that social security wealth had a small but statistically significant effect in reducing private savings (increasing consumption). He found similar results in other countries (Feldstein, 1980 ). Feldstein's work generated a substantial debate. One strand was theoretical and revolved around the appropriate model to test the underlying hypothesis. Barro (1974 Barro ( , 1978 , for example, argued that Feldstein's model ignored private intergenerational transfers (such as bequests to children from parents concerned about the burden of their own retirement benefits). The effect of these would be to offset exactly the impact of mandatory social security payments, so that Ricardian equivalence holds. Barro, using a consumption function similar to Feldstein's but with additional variables (the government surplus, the unemployment rate and the stock of durable goods), found using US data that the effect of social security wealth on consumption was statistically insignificant. 2 Another strand of the debate initiated by Feldstein concerned the measures that were used to proxy pension wealth. His social security wealth measure was a rather crude approximation to the underlying true variable which is the actuarial value of the social security pension that individuals expect to receive in retirement. Feldstein made the following simplifying assumptions: the ratio of benefits to disposable income remains constant over time at the historical average of 0.41; the number of future beneficiaries equals the number of current covered workers adjusted for differences in labour force participation by age; and the number of females receiving widow's benefits in future is proportional to the number of current male covered workers and pensioners. 3 Other investigators have found evidence inconsistent with the life cycle model's predictions that wealth built up during the working life is run down during retirement. Darby (1979) , Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) , and Laitner and Juster (1996) found that 'life cycle assets' in the USA (arising from accumulated savings) accounted for at most 30% of total US assets (the remainder having been inherited). Mirer (1979) , Danziger et al. (1983) and Horioka et al. (1996) found that the elderly in the USA and Japan do not decumulate wealth sufficiently rapidly (indeed they appear to accumulate wealth in the USA) to be consistent with the life cycle model (under certainty with no bequest motive). Friedman and Warshawsky (1990) found that the demand for annuities in retirement in the USA was too low if the life cycle model with life-time uncertainty was valid. This may be because annuity yields are actuarially unfair (for both adverse selection and moral hazard reasons), so that precautionary savings are higher than would otherwise be the case in the presence of uncertain lifetimes. Involuntary bequests would be an unintended consequence of this.
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Further evidence is available from cross-section studies. Most of these found that social security wealth tends to reduce savings, while private pension wealth tends to increase savings. Kotlikoff (1979) and Leimer and Richardson (1992) , using US data, found that social security wealth replaced between 0.6 and 0.67 of private wealth (rather than unity if the life cycle model was valid). Takayama (1990) found that social security wealth reduces the savings ratio in Japan by 12%.
5 Green (1981) , using UK data, found that occupational pension savings increased discretionary non-pension savings with coefficients in the range 0.48-1.19 (rather than À1 if there was perfect substitution).
Cross-section studies have also been used to determine the effect of pension schemes on inducing retirement. Disney et al. (1994) and Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) , in studies using UK data, found that workers with occupational pension rights tended to remain longer in particular jobs, but also tended to retire earlier than those without them; also the earlier the age at which workers began to accrue these rights, the more likely they were to take early retirement. The income and wealth effects of occupational pension assets therefore appear to dominate the intertemporal substitution effect which would tend to delay retirement since greater work leads to a higher final salary pension. For workers without occupational pension rights, the most likely causes of permanent job exit prior to normal retirement age are redundancy and ill-health. There are also offsetting effects present with unfunded state pension schemes, but they are rather different from those operating with funded private pension schemes. On the one hand, Boskin (1977) , Boskin and Hurd (1978) and Sheshinski (1978) , argue that if higher social security taxes are needed to pay the state pensions of the growing elderly population, this provides a disincentive effect that could lead to a reduction in labour force participation and earlier retirement. On the other hand, Blinder et al. (1980) argue that state pensions do not necessarily have the effect of encouraging earlier retirement, since delayed retirement after state pension age can result in a more than actuarially fair increase in the state pension. The effects differ with different social security systems, of course, and the net effect remains an empirical question for each system.
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The above review indicates three things. First, the debate over the effect of pension wealth on consumption and retirement decisions is far from being resolved. Second, there is an important need to use improved estimates of pension wealth. Third, the best modelling framework for testing the underlying hypotheses is unclear.
III. A MODEL OF CONSUMPTION AND RETIREMENT BEHAVIOUR

The consumption function
It is proposed to investigate the impact of different components of wealth on consumption using Merton's (1969 Merton's ( , 1971 representative agent model. 4 Similar inconsistencies with the life cycle model have been found using flow rather than stock data: Taylor (1971) , for example, found that for the USA the responsiveness of discretionary savings to a rise in social security contributions was À2.16, when it should be À1 if Ricardian equivalence held; Threadgold (1978) , using UK data, found that private pension savings tended to increase total savings; Pitelis (1985) , also using UK data, found that the responsiveness of discretionary non-pension savings to a rise in private pension savings varied between 0.8 and 1.25, whereas it should be À1 if there was perfect substitution between them. 5 However, some studies found no significant relationship between consumption and social security wealth, e.g. Blinder et al. (1983) , Kurz (1984) and David and Menchik (1985) , all using US data. 6 The psychological research literature also offers insights. Cagan (1965) , for instance, identified a recognition effect in individual behaviour. When someone is obliged to join a pension scheme, they begin to recognize for the first time the importance of saving for old age and this encourages them to save even harder. Similarly, Katona (1964) identified a goal gradient effect in individual behaviour, whereby effort is heightened the nearer individuals are to their goal. 7 It is well-known that the representative agent model provides a valid representation of microeconomic behaviour only under certain restrictive conditions concerning the distribution of income in the economy, namely that it is constant over time or at most a function of deterministic, time-dependent variables (Stoker, 1986) . However, Blundell et al. (1993) have shown that, once these 'aggregation factors' have been taken into account, a time-series-based representative agent model is not necessarily outperformed in terms of forecasting ability by microeconomic models involving panel data. A study by Goodman et al. (1997, chapter 3) indicates that the distribution of income in the UK was fairly stable over the post-war period (with a Gini coefficient of around 0.26) until 1985, after which inequalities (particularly at the extremes of the distribution) increased before stabilizing again by 1993 (when the Gini coefficient was 0.34). When a variable measuring the annual Gini coefficients over the sample period was included in the equations listed in Tables 1-3 , it was found to be statistically insignficant, indicating that the changes in the income distribution since 1985 were not sufficient to invalidate the representative agent model. Nevertheless, some investigators do not like the representative agent model in principle. Indeed, the representative agent is a strange creature: part young, part middle aged, part old; part male, part female; part employed, part unemployed, part retired, etc.
The simplest version of the model, based on a HARA utility function and time-invariant investment opportunities, gives optimal consumption as a linear function of wealth:
where the coefficients a and b are, in turn, functions of the utility function, investment opportunities and, possibly, time. In the special case of a logarithmic utility function and a finite horizon a ¼ 0 and b ¼ ðT À tÞ À1 , i.e., consumption is spread evenly over the remaining lifetime, a feature that is consistent with the life cycle hypothesis. If the horizon is infinite, a ¼ 0 and b ¼ , i.e., consumption is proportional to wealth, with the constant of proportionality equal to the rate of time preference, .
The Merton model has strong implications for how consumption is determined. It predicts that, apart from the parameters relating to the utility function and investment opportunities, current consumption depends only on current total wealth, not on the composition of wealth and not on any other variable.
8 But this is likely to hold only in a world of perfect capital and labour markets, where, for example, individuals can borrow against illiquid and non-tradeable assets such as pension wealth or human capital, and workers never experience involuntary unemployment.
In practice, the following possibilities must be allowed for: that individuals do not adjust their consumption instantaneously to changes in the level of wealth; that the components of wealth may have differential effects on consumption; that other characteristics of wealth may influence consumption (e.g. actual (rather than expected) rates of return on the wealth components); that individuals are liquidity constrained; that these constraints may change over time as a result of, say, financial deregulation; and that other factors may influence consumption.
These possibilities were accounted for in the following way:
. Lagged adjustment. The estimated equations included lags to allow long-run adjustments to differ from short-run adjustments.
. . Liquidity constraints. The effect of liquidity constraints is to introduce current income into the consumption function: they can account for the observed 'excess sensitivity' of consumption with respect to current income that is inconsistent with the life cycle model (Hall, 1978; Flavin, 1985; Zeldes, 1989; Cushing, 1992) . Take, for example, Equation 1 aggregated over all consumers who are not liquidity-constrained. Liquidity-constrained individuals are restricted to consuming their current income. If such individuals receive a fraction of total personal disposable income Y t equal to l, then the aggregate consumption function will take the form:
. Financial deregulation. The late 1970s and 1980s was a period of substantial financial deregulation and increasing competition between financial institutions. These forces had a major impact on personal consumption behaviour, in particular inducing a large fall in the personal savings ratio as consumers spent some of their housing equity. The effect of financial deregulation on the relaxation of liquidity and capital market constraints has been investigated by a number of authors, e.g. Manchester and Poterba (1989) , Bayoumi and Koujianou (1991) , Campbell and Mankiw (1991), Miles (1992) , and Bayoumi (1993a Bayoumi ( , 1993b . Most of these studies concluded that liquidity constraints had an important impact on consumption in the 1970s but, by the end of the 1980s, this impact had largely vanished, except in the case of Japan. 14 As a proxy for financial deregulation, Bayoumi (1993a, b) used the ratio of total outstanding consumer credit to GDP, transformed to equal 0 in 1975 and 1 in 1988 (FINDREG) on the grounds that 'since consumer credit is used to finance deviations of consumption from income, this ratio is a useful measure of the extent to which consumers are using credit markets to smooth consumption' (Bayoumi, 1993b (Bayoumi, , p.1435 15,16
. Life cycle factors. The Merton model as given in Equation 1 explains the optimal consumption behaviour of a representative agent with no bequest motive. In this framework, consumption is independent of the individual's age. Different investigators have accounted for life cycle factors in a variety of ways. Some include the proportions of the population who are respectively young (the youth dependency ratio (YOUTHDR)) and old (the elderly dependency ratio (AGEDR)) (e.g., Modigliani, 1970; Feldstein, 1980 and Miles and Patel, 1996) . Others include life expectancy (LIFEXP) (e.g. Hamermesh, 1985) . Some have attempted to discover a bequest motive. Hurd (1987) , for example, has tested for this using cross-section data by examining whether the savings of the elderly who have children is higher than the savings of the elderly without children. He finds no evidence for a bequest motive. However, this motive is impossible to test in an aggregate time-series context. . Labour market status. Clearly an individual's labour market status (employed or unemployed, in work or retired) can affect consumption behaviour. A number of investigators include the unemployment rate (UN ). Campbell and Mankiw (1991) , for example, test whether the increase in unemployment in the 1980s might have tended to counteract the positive impact of financial deregulation on consumption. Alternatively, if there is a trade-off (non-separability) between consumption and leisure, then real wages or hours worked should be included in the model, with rises in these two variables being associated with higher consumption; the unemployment rate can be used as a proxy for changes in hours worked (Barro, 1974 (Barro, , 1978 Burkhauser and Turner, 1982; Bayoumi, 1995) . However, not everyone who is not in work is registered as unemployed. An alternative measure that can be used is the labour force participation rate (LABPR). Other investigators have included either the retirement age (e.g. Munnell, 1974; Crawford and Lilien, 1981) or the labour force participation rate of the elderly (AGEPR) 17 (Feldstein, 1980) .
. Variables affecting portfolio decisions. Some investigators have included the variance of current income (YVOL), since uncertainty about income can reduce consumption and increase precautionary savings (Skinner, 1988; Caballero, 1990; Hendry, 1994 Others have included the inflation rate, because 'nominal rather, than real interest rate payments are considered to be income in the national accounts, hence in inflationary times consumers are forced to increase saving simply to keep their debt position stable' (Bayoumi, 1993b (Bayoumi, , p. 1434 . Hendry and von Ungern-Sternberg (1981) and Hendry (1994) use a variable that results from multiplying the value of liquid assets by the inflation rate (P Á F ). A high value for P Á F would be expected to induce individuals to increase their savings in order to maintain the real value of their liquid assets. . Spillover effects from other sectors. Some investigators have included the savings of the corporate (SC ) and government (SG) sectors since these might be substitutes for personal sector savings (complements for personal sector consumption) (Feldstein, 1974 , who used corporate retained earnings, Barro, 1974 Barro, , 1978 , who used the government surplus), Bayoumi, 1995, Miles and Patel, 1996) . Another possibility is to include the surplus in occupational pension schemes (SURPLUS ), on the grounds that some of the surplus might be shared with pensioners, but in any event increases the wealth of the shareholders of companies running surpluses.
Retirement behaviour
While there are still standard retirement ages (typically between 60 and 65), increasingly there is flexibility over the actual retirement age. At the same time, it is also the case that retirement is no longer a strict discrete choice 15 Other measures have been used such as the index of financial deregulation developed by Muellbauer and Murphy (1993) . 16 For an analysis of the role of credit markets in providing consumption insurance in the presence of aggregate uncertainty, see Cochrane (1991) and Mace (1991) . 17 The weighted average percentage of women above 60 and men above 65 who are still in work.
variable: some people are less than fully employed prior to normal retirement age; others continue to work after this age. In addition, it is possible to induce retirement. So the retirement decision is a very complex one and is therefore very difficult to model precisely in an aggregate time series model. It is proposed to investigate retirement behaviour by examining the factors influencing the labour force participation rate of the elderly (AGEPR). AGEPR has been falling steadily over the sample period just as per capita wealth has been increasing. So an obvious question is to ask whether this increase in wealth has helped to induce earlier retirement. Part of the reason for AGEPR falling is the increasing longevity of the population: there are more very old people now than 50-years ago but it is expected that very few of these to still be in work. To account for this LIFEXP is added to the equation. Some of the other variables that influence consumption might also influence AGEPR and this possibility is investigated as well. The model that is estimated below is an eclectic one and not based on any particular model of optimal retirement behaviour.
IV. THE ESTIMATED MODELS 1 8
The consumption function
The most general form of the consumption function considered was (in real per capita terms):
where:
W it ¼ ith component of wealth at t r it ¼ real return on ith component of wealth at t Z it ¼ ith (non-wealth) regressor out of M u t ¼ residual at t Equation 3 is an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model containing Ið1Þ variables (both endogenous and exogenous). As such it is a reparameterization of an error correction model (ECM ) and estimation methods suitable for difference-stationary variables in general need to be used. However, in the case of a model comprising either a single cointegrating vector or a recursive system (with zero correlation between the error terms), traditional methods of estimation and inference originally developed for trend-stationary variables can also be used. It is shown below that particular interesting cases of Equation 3 contain just a single cointegrating vector and that there is a recursive relationship between consumption and retirement behaviour (current consumption does not appear as a regressor in the latter equation). If the assumption of zero correlation between the error terms of the equations for consumption and retirement behaviour is made, then consistent estimates of the two-equation system can be derived using single equation methods (see Pesaran and Shin, 1997) . A more conventional approach would have been to use VAR estimation methods, but recent research has shown that any biases using these methods will be proportional to the dimension of the system which in the present case is large (see Gonzalo and Lee, 1998 and Abadir et al. 1999) . Other particular cases of interest of Equation 3 contain two cointegrating vectors. But tests indicate that, in each case, one of these vectors has parameters that are not significantly different from those derived using least squares estimation and the other vector has an insignificant adjustment parameter, so that there is no feedback from this vector. Efficiency can therefore be improved by dropping the second vector and again using traditional methods to estimate the ARDL model incorporating just a single cointegrating vector.
We first tested for the linear version of Merton's model which states that consumption is at most a linear function of aggregate wealth. Column (1) of Table 1 presents estimates for the case of a logarithmic utility function and an infinite horizon. In terms of Equation 3, the following restrictions are imposed:
This specification of the Merton model is rejected: the estimated equation is not well-specified and in particular does not constitute a cointegrating regression; in fact the trace likelihood ratio test indicates that there are no cointegrating vectors present. Nevertheless, a point estimate is derived for the rate of time preference for the UK personal sector of 3.3%. Column (2) presents the estimates for the more general case of a HARA utility function and an infinite horizon (see Equation 1), while column (3) introduces some shortterm dynamics for this case. Again neither equation is wellspecified: in particular the residuals are neither stationary nor serially uncorrelated. From this it may be concluded that the Merton model in which current consumption depends only on current aggregate wealth is rejected by the data.
The remaining columns of Table 1 examine the separate effects on consumption of the eight components of 2 tests indicate the degrees of freedom and the corresponding 5% critical value. 6. * indicates I(1) endogenous variable, ** indicates I(0) endogenous variable (about a trend), *** indicates I(1) exogenous variable, **** indicates I(0) exogenous variable (about a trend), ECM ¼ error correction term. 7. The test for the number of cointegrating vectors is the trace likelihood ratio test using a VAR of order 1 with unrestricted intercepts and trends (selected using the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion); beneath the figure indicating the number of cointegrating vectors is the test statistic for an additional cointegrating vector, followed by the 5% critical value for this test. The cointegrating vectors are normalized on the dependent variable. 8. The test for the parameters of a cointegrating vector being equal is based on a likelihood ratio test of over-identifying restrictions on the cointegrating vectors.
Given four cointegrating vectors, there are four just-identifying restrictions and four over-identifying restrictions for this test; hence there are four degreees of freedom for the test statistic. The restrictions were imposed on each cointegrating vector in turn.
aggregate wealth (i.e., allow the i to differ). The diagnostic tests indicate that there are four cointegrating vectors. However the resulting error correction model (column (4)) is poorly specified and in particular exhibits massive predictive failure over the period 1986-1994, which covered the late 1980s boom and the early 1990s slump. Of particular interest is the test for the equality of the coefficients on the cointegrating vectors (i.e. i ¼ , for all i). The hypothesis is decisively rejected for each of the four cointegrating vectors, only one of which (the last) has a significant adjustment parameter in the error correction model. Table 2 shows the results from including additional variables as regressors in the consumption function.
19 Column (1) adds these extra regressors (including the total return on wealth) to the equation involving aggregate wealth. The trace likelihood ratio test indicates the presence of just a single cointegrating vector, so that OLS provides superconsistent estimates of the parameters of this equation. The exclusion test indicates their joint significance and the equation passes all the diagnostic tests, except that for predictive failure over the period [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] . Column (2) adds the extra regressors to the equation involving the components of wealth, while column (3), in addition, separates the total return on wealth into its components. The trace likelihood ratio test indicates the presence of two cointegrating vectors for each of these cases. However, in each case, the test statistic reported immediately below indicates that the first of these vectors is not significantly different from that obtained from OLS estimation of the relevant restricted ARDL equation, while the second vector has a statistically insignificant adjustment parameter in the corresponding error correction model: the t-statistic is 0.92 in the case of the second cointegrating vector associated with column (2) and 0.62 in the case of the second cointegrating vector associated with column (3). Under these circumstances OLS estimation of the ARDL equations in columns (2) and (3) provide consistent estimates since the ECM term for the second cointegrating vector that is relegated to the residual term is by definition orthogonal to the included regressors. These equations also now pass all the diagnostic tests, including that for predictive failure.
Wealth has a direct net positive effect on consumption (with a marginal propensity of about 0.01). Of the components of wealth, housing wealth and state pension wealth (both from the basic scheme and SERPS) have positive effects (with marginal propensities of around 0.04, 0.03 and 0.22 $ 0.29, respectively), while private pension wealth (both occupational and personal) has negative effects (with coefficients of around À0.1 and À0.9 $ À1.1, respectively); this latter result is consistent with the recognition effect found by Cagan (1965) . Wealth also has an indirect effect since it influences retirement behaviour (in the present case measured by labour participation after normal retirement age). A negative relationship is found between consumption and AGEPR which reinforces the positive direct wealth effect on consumption, since rising wealth reduces AGEPR (see Table 4 below) and so indirectly increases consumption. The real return on aggregate wealth also has a positive impact on consumption (the marginal effect is about 0.02), indicating that the wealth effect of a change in the rate of return dominates the substitution effect. When the return on aggregate wealth is replaced by its components, only the returns on net financial wealth and basic state pension wealth are significant, again with positive coefficients.
Turning to the non-wealth variables, current income is highly significant, with a coefficient varying between 0.4 and 0.7 depending on the specification: the coefficient measures the proportion of consumers who are liquidity constrained. The significance of other non-wealth variables is sensitive to the specification of the wealth variables, with only government savings (SG) being significant in all three equations, and only pension fund surpluses (apart from AGEPR) being significant in both the equations using disaggregated wealth. Many variables that other investigators have found important turn out not to be significant when the wealth variable is measured correctly: durable assets, measures of financial deregulation, the age dependency ratio, life expectancy, the labour force participation rate, and income volatility. The specifications in Table 2 are fairly parsimonious with respect to non-wealth variables.
The results in the table can be compared with those from a study of national savings by Edwards (1996) who used a panel of 36 OECD, Latin American and East Asian countries (but excluding the USA and UK). His main conclusions were that private savings were negatively related to the elderly dependency ratio, government savings (with a coefficient of about À0.5), and social security spending. The present results for the UK indicate that the elderly dependency ratio is not a significant determinant of consumption or personal savings (suggesting that the shares of income consumed and saved do not change as British people get older, a result that contrasts both with the life cycle model and with Edwards' panel data evidence for other countries), that government savings partially displace personal savings (with a coefficient of about À0.2) and that social security wealth partially displaces personal savings (with a coefficient of either À0.03 or À0.3 depending on whether basic state pension wealth or SERPS wealth is used). A study by Poterba et al. (1996) found that raising contribution limits for tax-exempt Individual Retirement 
Accounts and 401(k) pension plans in the USA between 1983 and 1986 led to a one-for-one increase in personal savings. 20 Exactly the same result is found when personal pensions (the equivalent of IRAs and 401(k) plans) were introduced in the UK in 1988.
The results can also be compared with some crosssection studies for the UK. Alessie et al. (1997) , using a cohort analysis, while accepting that the high statutory downpayments on durables in the UK until June 1982 imposed a binding constraint on relatively young households, found that the sharp increase in consumer expenditure between 1985 and 1988 could not be explained by the additional steps towards full financial liberalization that took place between 1984 and 1986. A similar result is found here. Attanasio and Weber (1994) argued that the main cause of the consumer boom between 1985 and 1986 appeared to be upward revisions in expected lifetime labour income by the younger cohorts of the population who were mainly responsible for the boom; house price increases were important determinants of consumption after 1982, but could not on their own explain the consumption surge after 1985. It is also found that housing wealth is an important determinant of consumption, although it was not possible to find a statistically significant role for human capital. However, the principal explanation for the strong growth in consumption during the 1980s lies in the significant growth of state pension (especially SERPS) wealth and, to a lesser extent, in the growing occupational pension fund surpluses of the 1980s.
Figures 1-3 present dynamic forecasts from the three equations listed in Table 2 for the period 1986-1994. 21 Equation Cð1Þ underpredicts for the whole forecast period, especially over the boom period of the late 1980s. Equations Cð2Þ and Cð3Þ, which involve disaggregated wealth and returns, forecast the late 1980s boom much better, but overpredict the recovery of the 1990s.
The long-run elasticities for the model are presented in Table 3 . They were estimated using Bewley's (1979) method and are evaluated at sample means. The long-run elasticity of total wealth is about one-third, while there are positive elasticities for housing wealth, basic state pension wealth and SERPS wealth of about 0.07$0.08, 0.04 and 0.10 respectively, and negative elasticities of about À0.09 and À0.007, respectively, for occupational and personal pension wealth. The long-run income elasticity lies between 0.5 and 0.8. But the key point is the significant positive effect of state pension wealth on consumption and the significant negative effect of private pension wealth on consumption.
Retirement behaviour
Turning now to the elderly participation rate, Table 4 presents OLS estimates for the case in which aggregate wealth is a regressor and then for the case in which the components of wealth are included as regressors; the trace likelihood ratio test indicates that there is just a single cointegrating vector present in each of these two equations so that OLS provides super-consistent estimates. The diagnostic tests indicate that, on balance, the specification involving just aggregate wealth is preferred, although Fig. 4 indicates this equation slightly underpredicts the degree to which the dependent variable stabilizes in the 1990s. The inclusion of LIFEXP as an independent regressor corrects for the automatic effect that increasing longevity has on reducing AGEPR: as expected, a strong negative relationship is found between longevity and labour force participation after retirement. Given this correction, the other independent variables can be interpreted as causally influencing the retirement decision or at least the elderly participation rate. Table 5 shows the long-run elasticities for these two models. The table indicates that a 1% rise in aggregate wealth lowers the elderly participation rate by just under half of one per cent. This effect appears to arise principally from human capital (W L ), the present value of lifetime earnings and the largest single component of aggregate wealth. An increase in W L does not appear to have an independent effect on consumption, but it does have a significant positive effect on inducing retirement. Occupational pension wealth (W O ) also has a significant Table 2 , 1985-1994 positive effect on inducing retirement (with a long-run elasticity of À0:48). 22 However, rising housing wealth and personal pension wealth have the effect of delaying retirement. 23 The effect of income on elderly participation is strongly positive with an elasticity varying between 0.7 and 0.95. In the equation involving aggregate wealth, an increase in youth dependency has a strong effect in delaying retirement: people have to work longer if they have more children. Interestingly, state pension wealth appears to have no net effect on the retirement decision, suggesting that for the UK, the Sheshinski, Boskin and Hurd effect and the Blinder, Gordon and Wise effect (discussed in Section II) are exactly offsetting.
V. CONCLUSION
Economic theory suggests that the most suitable functional form for consumption is as a linear function of wealth. Capital and labour market imperfections may mean that the components of wealth have differential effects and that other variables such as those relating to income, labour market or demographic status and spillovers from other sectors also have important influences. Further, wealth can influence the retirement decision which, in turn, can affect consumption.
It is found that all these factors are important in the analysis of consumption and retirement behaviour in the UK. In particular, it is found that, when wealth is measured correctly to include pension wealth, housing wealth and human capital, relatively parsimonious models can be derived explaining both aggregate consumption and labour market participation by the elderly. These models forecast well between 1986 and 1994, a period for which conventional (mainly logarithmic) consumption functions have forecasted badly.
In terms of state pension wealth, similar results are found to those found by Feldstein (1974 Feldstein ( , 1976 Feldstein ( , 1979 Feldstein ( , 1982 , namely that state pensions have a strong savings replacement effect and reduce the need to save privately for retirement. However, they have no induced retirement effect (or at least an effect in reducing the elderly participation rate). Private occupational pensions, in contrast, have a direct effect in increasing savings (reducing consumption), but an indirect effect in lowering savings via their effect on lowering the elderly participation rate (which helps to raise consumption). The net effect on savings is positive, however. Private personal pensions also have a direct effect in increasing savings, and this is reinforced by the positive effect that personal pensions have in raising the elderly participation rate. 24 In addition, it was found that occupational pension fund surpluses had an effect in raising consumption (as a result of contribution holidays). So one possible explanation for conventional UK consumption functions underpredicting the consumer boom in the late 1980s is that they ignore pension wealth, especially state pension (SERPS) wealth and the occupational pension fund surpluses that arose from the stock market boom of the 1980s.
Three conclusions are drawn from this study. First, the results differ markedly from those found from other UK time-series studies that have tested the impact of pension wealth on consumption: it is suggested that the fact that these studies found no significant effect is due to their poor measures of pension wealth. Second, the results from this time-series study are broadly consistent with those from cross-section studies: for example, both types of study indicate that social security and housing wealth reduce personal savings, that private pension wealth increases personal savings, that occupational pensions help to induce retirement, and that personal pensions tend to delay retirement. Third, the present results do not appear to be consistent with the life cycle hypothesis: for example, it is not found that the share of income saved falls as people get older.
Certain important policy implications also emerge from this study. First, if governments wish to increase national savings or delay retirement, they should consider establishing individual retirement accounts for state pension schemes. This has been recommended by, inter alia, Feldstein (1978 Feldstein ( , 1997 . 25 Second, as capital market imperfections are increasingly eliminated, consumers will find that they can borrow against their 'illiquid' pension assets in the same way that they found they could borrow against their 'illiquid' housing assets from the beginning of the 1980s. This will have a striking impact on consumption and make it much more difficult for the authorities to influence consumption using conventional policy tools. It could even offset the positive savings effect from private, funded pension schemes.
APPENDIX: DATA CONSTRUCTION
Some of the data used in this study were taken from publicly available sources; other data needed to be constructed. Table A1 lists definitions and sources. All the level variables are measured in real per capita terms, while the rates of return are in real terms. The data are annual between 1948 and 1994.
The wealth variables and the rates of return on these needed to be constructed. Eight categories of personal wealth were used: net financial wealth, housing wealth, consumer durable assets, basic state pension wealth, state earnings related pension scheme (SERPS) wealth, occupational pension wealth, personal pension wealth, and human capital. The construction of the first seven categories was undertaken in Blake and Orszag (1999) and the data for these variables are taken directly from this source. Human capital is estimated as the expected present value of lifetime earnings for the whole adult population (assuming a constant real discount rate of 3%, the same as that used by the Government Actuary's Department in preparing estimates of state and occupational pension benefits in the UK).
The definitions of the rates of return are also given in Table A1 . The expected rate of return from membership of a defined benefit pension scheme has to take into account the fact that while current pension contributions buy current accrued pension rights, the actual pension benefit does not take place until retirement. The means that accrued benefits have to be revalued and survived to retirement age, dynamized from retirement age until death and then discounted back to the date of accrual in order to find the internal rate of return on the scheme.
Contributions (K t ) into a defined benefit scheme are usually proportional to current income and in the case of occupational schemes attract tax relief: 1. This variable is measured in real per capita terms. The nominal variable (in £bn, current prices) is divided by P Â POP, where P is the index of retail prices (1990 ¼ 1) and POP is the population aged 15 or above (in millions)) 2. Personal savings is defined as: personal disposable income minus consumers expenditure on goods and services. This implies that contributions to the state pension schemes, because they are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, are not part of aggregate personal savings (they are treated as transfers from current workers to current pensioners), but contributions to private funded pension schemes are part of aggregate personal savings. 3. This variable is a real rate of interest expressed in the form ln ((1 þ k)/(1 þ g p )) where k is the nominal return and g p is the inflation rate (ln(P/P À1 )). 4. The total workforce is defined as the sum of the workforce in employment and the unemployed. 5. The workforce in employment is defined as the sum of employees in employment, the self-employed, those in work-related government training programmes and those serving in HM Armed Forces.
where t ¼ member's contribution rate; Y t ¼ member's current income, and 1 ¼ marginal tax rate in work. These contributions buy an accrued benefit (B t ) which is generally related to salary at retirement and is taxable. Define: 
The expected nominal return from scheme membership is the discount rate k that equates the present values of benefits in Equation A2 and current contributions in Equation A1 (i.e. the internal rate of return).
The internal rates of return can be calculated on the three defined benefit schemes for the average scheme member who in the case of the state scheme is 41 years old with 21 years to retirement (M ¼ 21) and in the case of an occupational scheme is 43 years old with 19 years to retirement (M ¼ 19). It is noted that the rate of return will not depend on the member's current income, Y t . It will also not depend on the tax rate so long as contributions are tax relieved and the pension is taxed at the same rate as contributions are relieved (i.e. 1 ¼ 2 ): a pension scheme gives a tax subsidy during the contribution phase but (with the exception of the tax-free lump sum) takes it back during the benefit phase. However, the state pension schemes do not give tax relief on contributions, yet the pension is taxable, so there might be a tax effect with these schemes. Also if the marginal tax rate is lower in retirement than in work, this will generate a tax effect, since the pension scheme then permits tax avoidance rather than simply tax deferral. The rate of return will depend positively on the accrual rate, the growth rate in labour productivity, the assumed inflation rate and on longevity; it will be negatively related to the contribution rate.
The pension length differs according to the type of scheme: occupational pension scheme members tend to experience lighter mortality than the population as a whole and so will tend to draw their pensions for longer. The estimated pension lengths in the state schemes were based on commonly-used mortality tables covering the whole population, namely English Life Tables No. 11  ( [1950] [1951] [1952] , No. 12 (1960 No. 12 ( -1962 , No. 13 (1970 -1972 ), and No. 14 (1980 , with interpolation for intervening years. The case of a 'hybrid' 41-year-old male with a 36-year-old spouse was taken. For example in 1981, such a man could expect to live until he was 73 years and his wife could expect to live until she was 79. If this man retired at 62 (i.e. half way between the state retirement age for men and women), his pension length would be 11 years and the surviving spouse's pension length would be six years. In contrast, with occupational schemes, the estimated pension lengths were based on the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries' Tables a(55) and a(90) for annuitants, again with interpolation for intervening years; the expected lifetime of an annuitant equals the value of a life-time annuity of one unit when the interest rate is zero. These tables indicate that occupational pension scheme members and their spouses live about five years longer than for the population as a whole.
In the case of the basic state pension scheme, the contribution rate ( t ) is 2% of the LEL. There is no tax relief on contributions into the BSP scheme and although the BSP is taxable, its annual value is below the single individual's personal allowance, so tax effects can be ignored here. In terms of Equation A1, Y t ¼ LEL t and 1 ¼ 0. The average annual accrual rate ( t ) is 2.42% (i.e. the average of the male and female accrual rates of 1/44th and 1/39th respectively).
In the case of SERPS, there is no tax relief on contributions made by the employee, but the SERPS pension is taxable and the average person is likely to pay tax on it once the BSP has been taken into account. The annual pension accrual rate has been falling over time:
The GAD surveys of occupational pension schemes found the average member's gross contribution rate into such schemes has been rising over time: Interpolation was used for the intervening years. The average annual accrual rate is 1.67% (i.e. 1/60th). Most people commute part of their pension into a tax-free lump sum of 1.50 times their final salary and receive a reduced pension based on the 80th scale (i.e. 1.25%) but this equates to an accrual rate of approximately 1.67%.
Personal pension schemes are defined contribution schemes and the value of the pension depends exclusively on the size of the contributions and the subsequent investment performance. The minimum net contribution rate into an appropriate personal pension scheme is equal to the contracted out rebate as follows: 5% 1988-1992 2.0% 1993+ 1.8%
The GAD's 1991 survey of occupational pension schemes (Table 6 .5) showed that the average member's contribution rate into a money purchase scheme was higher than the minimum at 4.95%. The rate of return on personal pension scheme assets is defined by: The data for Equation A3 are taken from Table 12 of Blake and Orszag (1999) .
The rates of return used in the analysis are listed in Table A2 . Table A3 shows the means and standard deviations of the variables used in the analysis. It also shows that most of the variables contain unit roots. However, LIFEXP, YVOL and most of the rates of returns are stationary.
Figures A1-A6 show graphs of some of the data used in the analysis. Figure A1 shows the well-known strong positive relationship between consumption expenditure and personal disposable income over the period . Figure A2 shows that net financial wealth was fairly static during the 1950s and 1960s, but fell sharply as a result of the high inflation of the 1970s and then rose sharply as a result of the stock market boom of the 1980s and 1990s. Housing wealth has risen sharply over the period, but has been subject to three significant booms and slumps since 1970. Figures A3 and A4 show how state and private pension wealth have grown steadily over the period. Figure A5 shows how significant the weighting of human capital (W L ) is in aggregate wealth. Finally Fig. A6 shows that the elderly participation rate has been falling over most of the period, but appears to have stabilized in the 1980s. 
